期刊文章%@ 1438-8871 %I JMIR Publicatio卡塔尔世界杯8强波胆分析ns %V 23 %N 9 %P卫生保健区块链系统令牌经济机制设计:基于模拟现实场景的发展研究%A Jung,Se Young %A Kim,Taehyun %A Hwang,Hyung Ju %A Hong，庆杓%+，浦项科技大学数学系，77，浦项市南区清岩路，37673，韩国，82 054 279 2056，hjhwang@postech.ac.kr %K机制设计%K优化%K区块链%K代币经济%K电子健康记录%K医疗保健%K经济%K健康记录%D 2021 %7 13.9.2021 %9原始论文%J J医疗互联网Res %G英文%X背景:尽管电子健康记录的采收率在高收入国家中显著提高，但个人健康记录仍然难以适当传播。代币经济通过区块链智能合约，可以通过向患者提供激励，更好地分发个人健康记录。然而，关于在设计区块链激励机制时应考虑的特定因素的研究很少。目的:本文的目的是在医疗保健区块链平台的现实场景中提供两个新的代币经济数学模型。方法:首先，为医疗保健区块链平台及其令牌流设置角色。其次，介绍了2个场景:为人寿保险公司的激励计划收集生活日志数据，以激励客户多锻炼;为抗癌药物的临床试验招募参与者。在我们的两个场景中，我们假设有3个利益相关者:参与者、数据接收者(公司)和数据提供者(医疗保健组织)。我们还假设激励最初由数据接受者支付给参与者，他们关注通过调整机制设计最小化经济和时间成本。 This concept can be seen as a part of game theory, since the willingness-to-pay of data recipients is important in maintaining the blockchain token economy. In both scenarios, the recruiting company can change the expected recruitment time and number of participants. Suppose a company considers the recruitment time to be more important than the number of participants and rewards. In that case, the company can increase the time weight and adjust cost. When the reward parameter is fixed, the corresponding expected recruitment time can be obtained. Among the reward and time pairs, the pair that minimizes the company’s cost was chosen. Finally, the optimized results were compared with the simulations and analyzed accordingly. Results: To minimize the company’s costs, reward–time pairs were first collected. It was observed that the expected recruitment time decreased as rewards grew, while the rewards decreased as time cost grew. Therefore, the cost was represented by a convex curve, which made it possible to obtain a minimum—an optimal point—for both scenarios. Through sensitivity analysis, we observed that, as the time weight increased, the optimized reward increased, while the optimized time decreased. Moreover, as the number of participants increased, the optimization reward and time also increased. Conclusions: In this study, we were able to model the incentive mechanism of blockchain based on a mechanism design that recruits participants through a health care blockchain platform. This study presents a basic approach to incentive modeling in personal health records, demonstrating how health care organizations and funding companies can motivate one another to join the platform. %M 34515640 %R 10.2196/26802 %U //www.mybigtv.com/2021/9/e26802 %U https://doi.org/10.2196/26802 %U http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34515640